The Crisis of State Collapse and Gang Rule in Haiti

Distr.: General | February 26, 2026 Sixty-first session | Agenda item 15

I. Introduction

1. This report evaluates the catastrophic collapse of public order and state authority in Haiti. As of early 2026, the country is navigating a critical transitional deadline. With the mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council nearing its end, the scheduled August 2026 elections remain contingent on a drastic improvement in security.

2. The Task Force observes that armed gangs now control an estimated 90% of Port-au-Prince and have expanded aggressively into the Artibonite and Centre departments. This is no longer merely "criminal activity"; it is a territorial insurgency that has replaced the state in providing (and extorting) basic functions.

II. Findings on Violence and the Humanitarian Emergency

3. Terror as Governance: Gangs such as the "Viv Ansanm" coalition use systematic kidnapping, massacres, and public executions to maintain control. Between January and September 2025 alone, over 4,300 people were killed.

4. Sexual Violence as Punitive Control: The use of collective rape and sexual slavery against women and girls has surged. It is used as a deliberate tool to punish communities suspected of cooperating with the police or rival groups. US funding cuts in early 2026 have further crippled the medical and psychosocial response for these survivors.

5. Catastrophic Hunger: Over 5.7 million Haitians—half the population—face crisis levels of food insecurity. Gang control of major transport routes has effectively "starved" the capital, with farmers in rural areas forced to pay "taxes" in produce just to access their own land.

6. Child Recruitment: There is an "alarming increase" in child recruitment. The UN now assesses that at least 30% to 50% of gang members are children, lured by the promise of food or forced into service through death threats.

III. Legal Analysis: The Vacuum of Accountability

7. The Haitian judicial system has largely ceased to function. In the absence of state protection, "self-defense" groups have proliferated, often committing extrajudicial killings that further fuel the cycle of violence.

8. The deployment of the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) and the establishment of the UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) provide a new legal framework for intervention, but these forces must be strictly bound by international human rights law to avoid the abuses seen in past missions.

IV. Legal Recommendations

• Arms Embargo Enforcement: Member states must strengthen the enforcement of the UN arms embargo, specifically targeting the maritime and aerial routes used to smuggle high-powered weapons from North America and the Caribbean into Haitian ports.

• Specialized Human Rights Bench: Support the creation of a specialized domestic judicial unit, backed by international advisors, to prosecute gang leaders for crimes against humanity, ensuring that no future political transition includes blanket amnesties for grave violations.

• Protection of Children: Legally reclassify children associated with gangs as victims of trafficking and forced recruitment. This shift is essential to prioritize their rehabilitation and reintegration over criminal prosecution.

• Non-Refoulement and Asylum: Neighboring states must adhere to the principle of non-refoulement. Given the "generalized violence" and state collapse, Haitians fleeing the country meet the legal criteria for refugee status under the Cartagena Declaration.

V. Conclusion

Haiti is at a definitive crossroads. Security enforcement through the GSF is a necessary immediate step, but it cannot be the only solution. Without a parallel legal effort to rebuild the judiciary, feed the population, and hold the financial backers of these gangs accountable, the state will remain in a cycle of collapse. The 2026 elections cannot be held in a climate of terror; they require a foundation of basic human rights that currently does not exist.